South Sudan

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post covers June 17 to June 23.   

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post covers February 11 to February 17.

Test your knowledge of South Sudan, from its battle for independence to its economic development.

Elizabeth Munn is the Spring 2019 volunteer intern with the Africa program at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She is a student at George Mason University, studying global affairs and African studies. On February 20, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan issued its third report. Despite the peace deal signed six months ago in September, it documented an increase in cases of rape and sexual violence over the past year, concluding that the crimes had “become quite normalized” in South Sudan. Driving much of this is oil.  According to the report, the state-owned oil company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet), has demonstrated a “total lack of transparency and independent oversight” in its diversion of oil revenues into the hands of government elites. The structure of the company is deliberately designed to allow for autocratic control: it is run by a managing director who is accountable to a board of directors whose members are appointed by the president. To the board, the government has appointed loyalists, particularly individuals from the National Security Services (NSS), which has been accused [PDF] of human rights abuses. This process has allowed Nilepet‘s oil revenue to be diverted to the security services, who in turn purchase weapons and other military equipment. In fact, a majority of Nilepet’s revenues in 2015 were used to fund over two hundred thousand soldiers stationed in conflict areas near oil fields. Further, Nilepet received a letter from government elites asking for $1.5 million for military expenses in 2016. South Sudan produces around ninety million barrels of oil a year and the vast majority of the revenue finds its way back to political and economic elites, while, according to 2016 data from the World Bank, the poverty rate stands at 82 percent. With oil income accounting for about 98 percent of the government’s budget, the parties in conflict have targeted oil-producing states and facilities in efforts to gain money and power. The struggle has entirely neglected the needs of the average citizen. A report by Global Witness documented how some South Sudanese must resort to the black market to obtain fuel, where prices can reach 300 South Sudanese pounds ($2.30) just to fill a one-liter plastic bottle, equivalent to almost $9 a gallon. Although Nilepet is under the complete control of the government, it is considered a private company, meaning it is not subject to the same oversight as a government agency. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan advocated for increased accountability and transparency in oil companies, such as Nilepet, to overcome deeply-rooted corruption in oil-rich nations. This likely requires international support against corrupt practices.  The U.S. Commerce Department has designated foreign and domestic oil entities operating in South Sudan as threats to U.S. national security because of their role in the conflict. These other state-owned companies, which dominate oil production in South Sudan alongside Nilepet, are the Chinese National Petroleum Company, Petronas of Malaysia, and the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation. Unlike those of China, Malaysia, and India, many other international companies have abandoned oil production in South Sudan altogether.  South Sudan is home to one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. International efforts, such as those of the U.S. Department of Commerce, are needed to call attention to the severity of the issue and push South Sudan to implement accountability and transparency in the oil industry and among the security services.   

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

Dan Sullivan is the senior advocate for human rights at Refugees International. South Sudan is facing one of the largest displacement crises in the world. A recent peace agreement is stoking hopes for returns of displaced people to their homes. But with ongoing instability and a lack of sufficient planning, returns remain a dangerous prospect.  Nearly 4.5 million South Sudanese have been forcibly displaced since civil war broke out in December 2013. That equates to roughly 40 percent of the pre-war population displaced either within the country or as refugees to surrounding countries. So it is understandable that when a new Revitalized Peace Agreement was signed in September 2018, international actors were eager to start finding ways for those displaced to return to their homes. There is just one glaring problem: it is not yet safe for large-scale returns to take place. A recent Refugees International (RI) report, Displaced Nation: The Dangerous Implications of Rushed Returns in South Sudan, looked at the prospects of returns by focusing on the internally displaced persons (IDPs) most likely to be the first to face pressure to return. These include the nearly two hundred thousand IDPs living in or adjacent to UN peacekeeping bases, in what are known as protection of civilian sites (PoCs). RI interviewed IDPs in Juba and Wau, as well as UN and humanitarian officials.  We found that IDPs in the PoCs were experiencing difficult and crowded conditions and most had a desire to return to their homes. However, most also felt it was not safe to do so. In particular, IDPs who had fled ethnically motivated atrocities feared that they would be targeted by armed actors upon return. RI was also struck by the lack of planning and concerted efforts to inform IDPs about return options and to ensure a continuation of protection and life-saving aid services in potential areas of returns.  The reality of the ongoing insecurity was underscored recently during a horrific ten-day period starting in late November in which some 125 women were sexually assaulted on their way to a food distribution site not far from the largest PoC site in Bentiu. Adding to the challenge of returns are high-levels of food insecurity (nearly 60 percent of the population has faced acute food insecurity this year) and continuing cases of aid manipulation. RI found instances in which aid had been diverted away from civilians and into the hands of armed actors. We also saw evidence that the government had used instability in some areas as an excuse to restrict aid to populations in need.  Humanitarians are making a great effort to avoid the diversion of aid. However, they need additional support from both donors and the UN leadership in speaking with a unified voice to the government of South Sudan against such manipulation. This can and must be done in a way that ensures sustained levels of aid, without which the country would almost certainly be facing famine. Finally, international aid efforts must be careful not to reinforce ethnic dislocation that has taken place as a result of the fighting and severe human rights violations, which may amount to crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The ability of the peace agreement to bring real security remains a work in progress, especially as several key areas of disagreement remain unresolved. But even if the peace muddles forward, safe and voluntary returns will only be possible with serious planning that includes a real effort to inform potential returnees and to assure sustained protection and life-saving aid.  How the first returns from PoCs play out will be closely watched and will have far reaching consequences for the millions more displaced throughout the region.  

Adam Valavanis is a volunteer intern in the Africa program at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. On September 12 in Ethiopia, President Salva Kiir and former vice president and opposition leader Riek Machar signed what was meant to be the final peace deal in South Sudan’s civil war, bringing an end to nearly five years of fighting. The new deal would return Machar to power, where he would serve as the “first” of five vice presidents, and maintain Kiir as president. Despite this latest development, the promise of lasting peace in South Sudan remains a distant hope.  Fighting between rebels, ostensibly under Machar’s command, and government forces, ostensibly under Kiir’s, resumed less than one week after the signing. But it is not clear if these skirmishes are related to the content of the recent deal; soldiers on both sides have reportedly engaged in violence at the behest of local leaders, rather than of Kiir or Machar, signaling a broken chain of command. Nevertheless, this violation comes three months after the collapse of a previous ceasefire, the Khartoum Declaration, which was signed in late June.  The United States, United Kingdom, and Norway, commonly referred to as the Troika and who supported South Sudan’s push for independence in 2011, expressed concerns over this most recent peace deal. Their skepticism is at least partly the result of years of consistently broken ceasefires. But even if these skirmishes ended and Kiir and Machar successfully reined in their forces, it is hard to believe that the current peace deal would prevent the country from sliding back into civil war in the months and years to follow. At its core, the deal fails to address the root causes of the civil war: unequal access to government resources and near-authoritarian powers of the president. Instead, it reaffirms the presidency’s enormous powers, which are codified in the 2011 transitional constitution.  Specifically, the transitional constitution grants unchecked powers to the office of the presidency, such as the power to appoint and dismiss elected representatives at the federal and state levels. Before the outbreak of violence in 2013, Kiir and Machar butted heads over the unequal distribution of power in government; Machar reportedly felt that he was effectively shut out from power in his role as vice president. Meanwhile, Kiir began consolidating his rule and undermining the country’s nascent democracy. In this context, Machar understood that any attempt to unseat Kiir in the future via democratic elections was fruitless. With his sacking in 2013, it became clear to Machar that his only remaining avenue to the presidency was to take up arms, which he did later that year. If the country is to see lasting peace, any future deals must radically reform the transitional constitution to promote inclusivity and diffuse power away from the office of the president. By instituting a parliamentary executive, federalism, and proportional representation, South Sudan will begin to ensure stable democratic rule in the country. In light of the political splintering that has occurred in the last few years, a diverse array of parties, particularly rebel groups, must be included in all future peace talks. By excluding them, any government that results from these talks risks lacking the requisite support to prevent war.

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

Abigail Van Buren is an interdepartmental program assistant at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.  On June 27, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar met in person for the first time in two years and agreed to a ceasefire to end the civil war, now in its fifth year. Dubbed the Khartoum Declaration, this latest ceasefire may initially appear to be a victory, but violence resumed mere hours after it went into effect. Unfortunately, the violation of agreements is not the exception to the rule in South Sudan, but the rule itself. The continuous splintering of political groups and the lack of acknowledgement they subsequently receive, coupled with the competing agendas of regional states and organizations, all but dooms these deals from the start. In 2011, the ruling SPLM party split in two. Kiir leads the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG), and Machar, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO). Today, there are close to a dozen warring parties. Nevertheless, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) prioritizes a two-party negotiated settlement, effectively ignoring the interests of these splinter groups. Furthermore, the Khartoum Declaration holds that all relevant provisions of the 2015 Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) shall apply unless decided otherwise, but the new parties that emerged since ARCSS have demands that past agreements never addressed. For example, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance has requests that focus on addressing ethnic divisions in the nation. This raises questions about the acceptability and therefore feasibility of the Khartoum Declaration and the role these groups should play in negotiations. Currently, IGAD’s stance on how much power Machar will have in the transitional government remains ambiguous, as does what kind of guarantees may be afforded to newer, smaller factions. Further complicating conflict resolution are the disparate agendas of regional organizations and neighboring states. In recent agreements, the SPLM-IO only grudgingly acquiesced to provisions for the African Union (AU) and IGAD to oversee the ceasefire. The SPLM-IO perceives the Ugandan and Kenyan governments—both prominent members of IGAD—to be long-time supporters of the SPLM-IG. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has provided Kiir’s government with military aid and has established his country as South Sudan’s most important trading partner. Today, Uganda exports $189 million worth of goods to South Sudan. The fall of Kiir threatens these ties. In addition, Kiir has been heavily involved with Kenya’s LAPSSET corridor, a large transportation infrastructure project part of Kenya’s Vision 2030 strategy. Leadership changes in the South Sudanese government could therefore delay Kenya’s infrastructure modernization timeline.  On the other hand, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has continued to show personal support to Machar as most of the oil fields are in Nuer (Machar’s ethnic group) territory. Moreover, Sudan owns the only viable transport route for South Sudanese oil to reach international markets. This means that all of Kiir’s oil revenue depends on Sudan’s infrastructure, though the LAPSSET corridor could change that. Al-Bashir’s strategic relationship with the two men gives him strong sway over negotiations, but could also corrupt the integrity of the peace agreement if his sole motive is increasing his country’s oil revenue.  The splintering of political parties and the parochial economic interests of regional countries are two significant roadblocks to the success of the Khartoum Declaration ceasefire. The mediators and signatories of South Sudanese reconciliation negotiations must work together to create a new, comprehensive peace agreement that is more than just a renewal of ARCSS by focusing on sincere conflict resolution over temporary satiation of fighting groups. For lasting peace, stakeholders must be more inclusive of new political factions by considering all grievances and ensure that regional country interests are not fulfilled at the expense of regular South Sudanese citizens.    

Welcome to “Global Conflict This Week,” a series that highlights developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week. Stay up to date on these conflicts and others with the online interactive, the Global Conflict Tracker, from the Center for Preventive Action (CPA). Peace Deal Prospects Dim in South Sudan On July 9, rebels in South Sudan rejected a peace plan that would have reinstated insurgent leader Riek Machar as vice president, claiming it would leave President Salva Kiir with too much power. Then on July 12, South Sudan's parliament voted to extend President Salva Kiir's term until 2021, a move opposition groups have claimed would be illegal. Separately, a UN investigation revealed that South Sudan government troops and allied forces killed at least 232 civilians and carried out mass rapes of women and girls in attacks on opposition-held villages in the country’s north in April and May. Revisit CPA’s report Ending South Sudan’s Civil War and CFR’s The Internationalist blog post, “Salvaging South Sudan’s Sovereignty (and Ending its Civil War),” for proposals on bringing peace to South Sudan. More on the civil war in South Sudan » UN Envoy Warns Israel Over Ban on Goods into Gaza Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered an immediate closure of the primary cargo crossing, Kerem Shalom, between Israel and the Gaza Strip on July 9 in response to incendiary kites and balloons launched into Israel by Palestinians. The following day, UN Special Coordinator to the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov urged Israeli officials to reverse the decision. “Everyone must step back from the trajectory of confrontation and escalation,” Mladenov said. More on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict » Developments Across Afghanistan U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made a surprise visit on July 9 to Kabul, where he promised support for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s push to initiate peace negotiations with the Taliban. The next day, more than two hundred religious scholars from fifty-seven countries convened in Saudi Arabia to discuss ways to end the conflict in Afghanistan. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), some 13,700 Afghans returned voluntarily or were deported from Iran in the first week of July, bringing the total number of returnees from the country so far this year to more than 370,500. The IOM cited “deteriorating protection space” in Iran and Pakistan as push factors. Separately, a U.S. service member was killed and two others wounded on July 7 in a so-called insider attack at a small outpost in Uruzgan Province. CFR’s Courtney Cooper argues that the recent cease-fires underscore the importance of confidence-building measures in building peace in Afghanistan. More on the war in Afghanistan » Over One Thousand Ceasefire Violations in Ukraine The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine reported 1,200 ceasefire violations last week, as fighting between the Ukrainian armed forces and separatists in the east continues. More on the conflict in Ukraine » Bombing at Campaign Rally in Pakistan Kills More Than Twenty A suicide bomber attacked a campaign rally held by the secular Awami National Party (ANP) in Peshawar on July 10, killing twenty-one people including provincial assembly candidate Haroon Ahmed Bilour. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, which wounded sixty-five other people, vowing more attacks and warning people to stay away from ANP rallies. Nationwide elections in Pakistan are scheduled for July 25. More on Islamist militancy in Pakistan »