The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Relations, With Susan M. Gordon and Michael G. Mullen

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations.

With me to discuss the nature and extent of U.S. support for Taiwan, in light of the resurgence of great power competition with China, are Susan Gordon and Admiral Mike Mullen. Sue served as principal deputy secretary of National Intelligence from 2017 to 2019. Before that, she served as a deputy director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. She served for four decades as a career intelligence officer in the Central Intelligence Agency and at NGA. Admiral Mullen served as the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff from 2007 to 2011. Before that, he was the Navy's twenty-eighth chief of naval operations, the most senior position in the United States Navy. He served in the navy for more than four decades. Sue and Mike are co-chairs of the CFR sponsored independent task force titled, U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China, which was released today. You can download a copy of the report at cfr.org. Sue and Mike, thank you for joining me.

GORDON:
Great to be here.

MULLEN:
Nice to be with you, Jim.

LINDSAY:
Sue, if I can, I'll begin with you. For decades, Washington has essentially finessed the question of Taiwan's status in its relations with Beijing. China claims Taiwan is part of its sovereign territory, but so far has not sought to forcibly reclaim the island. The United States in return does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country. We have no treaty obligation to defend that, but the United States also says that any reunification effort should be done peacefully and with Taiwan's consent. Is this strategy of essentially finessing Taiwan's status sometimes called strategic ambiguity sustainable in the face of rising Chinese power?

GORDON:
Jim, I think it's a great question and I think it's one that was really at the heart of this study. So I think I'd say that the policy or the history of agreements has certainly worked heretofore in that we have not had military conflict with China over Taiwan, and that is a horrible event to imagine. So the fact that it's been forestalled by this approach has been good. The concern is that there are actions being taken by China that suggest that their interest and/or their pace in reunification may be changing, and that coupled with their military advances, their moves against Taiwan to do either demonstrations or coercive actions suggest that their timeframe or their approach to reunification might not stay either at some point in the future or with mutual agreement with Taiwan. And so I think that's what makes us question whether the policy is going to be the one that will last. The report really focuses on, given that we see that move, what should the U.S. do in order to continue to deter and continue to support?

LINDSAY:
So Sue, there are two things there. One is capabilities. The capabilities of the Chinese military, in particularly I would imagine it's navy and also the issue of Chinese intent. What is China or the Chinese leadership thinking of doing? Admiral, can I ask you just to give your assessment of Chinese power? How much it has changed over the last several decades and what kind of realistic threat it poses to Taiwan given that Taiwan is an island, it's a hundred miles off the Chinese mainland. So if we were to talk about an invasion, you're talking about an amphibious operation and those are incredibly challenging purely as a military matter.

MULLEN:
Well, I think the amphibious invasion piece is as difficult if not the most difficult military operation that exists in terms of capabilities, coordination and particularly when you're looking at is what notionally in the military sense is normally it takes about three times the size of your force to overcome a smaller force, a three to one ratio typically. I thought what Sue said was exactly right. What has changed, and I think part of the report that's really significant is we try to lay out what has changed over the years. It's not the late 1940s anymore. It's not 1972. Lots of things have changed. In particular the leadership in China, it's very clear that the current leadership has made this a much higher priority. They've taken very coercive steps, many of them military but not exclusively military. They've taken it in the economic and geopolitical world as well, isolating Taiwan as much as they can.

The signal from President Xi Jinping, he's told his military to be ready by 2027. He's clearly made statements that this can't go on forever, needs to be resolved no later than the hundredth anniversary of party, which I think is in 2049. And that is very different from his predecessors who often said it may take a hundred years or a thousand years. The implication of that statement to me is it's not one we should destroy ourselves over. And to Sue's point, and we make it in the report that a conflict would be a disaster, not just for the countries, China and the U.S., but for the world for lots of reasons. So the Chinese leadership has invested mightily in the Chinese military in the last couple of decades. They are much more capable than they used to be. There's no question about that. All of that said, back to the complexity of the operation, it's not a given. It's not an easy operation, and I'm sure that the leadership knows that. 

A very important theme in the report that we focus on is deterrence is failing. It hasn't failed because actually it doesn't fail until you have a conflict, but it is failing and we need to restore the deterrence that stood us well over four plus decades. But because of the coercion, because of the change in leadership, because of the shift to the global competition, the global power competition that's ongoing, the United States and our allies need to focus on this much more strengthened deterrence so that we don't have that devastating conflict.

LINDSAY:
Sue, I want to draw you out if I may, on this question of Chinese intent. Obviously China has risen as a great power. It's acquired more military assets. It's now in the act of building aircraft carriers, which in theory down the road could project global power. But there's also this element of what the actual intent is. Mike has pointed out that Xi Jinping has apparently signaled to his military leaders that he wants the capacity to force the reunification of Taiwan sometime later in this decade. Just given your experience being in the intelligence business, how do you think about intent or assessing intent? Because sometimes talk can just be that, people can talk, leaders can talk because they're speaking to domestic audiences, not necessarily setting policy. So how does that figure into this issue of deterrence?

GORDON:
I think that's a great question. I think one of the ways to think of it is what are their interests? And that's one of the ways you get out of your own hubris and you say, "Well, what are China's interests that are at stake with Taiwan?" And one is, and this is real, is the nationalistic interest. And that is from their perspective, their sovereignty, their control, their domain, their influence, and they consider Taiwan part of that. And so that is going to be one of Xi Jinping's and China's interest is in maintaining that. And when they see that starting to erode either through Taiwan's being swept up in this wave of freedom, whether they're seeing what's going on in Ukraine or they saw what happened in Hong Kong, or just as democratic forces kind of take hold on the island, that interest starts to be in peril and so you see them wanting to do it.

The second is economic interests and the economic interests take two forms. One is we know that expansionism is part of economic stability for them as that is under pressure just because as the world kind of rallies against that expansionism, they have to maintain their economic strength, economic partnerships, economic exports and imports. And so again, what happens on Taiwan with semiconductors is important to them. They can't lose that. What happens to other democratic nations wanting to put pressure on them through sanctions or denying them trade. So that becomes an interest and they want to put that more in their control. 

And then I think they're just the interests of security in their regime from their perspective, we have our own perspective on regional security, what they do as well. All of those interests I think go through Taiwan to them. And if their interest can be maintained without them being challenged, then that timeframe extends. If there are things that happen that look like, "Oh my gosh, I might lose my control over those interests," then the timeframe shortens. And I think from China's perspective, what they're signaling is that they perceive that those are under more challenge and they are more urgent about making sure that those interests. And so I think that's the way you break out intent and what you're trying to do is to change that equation so that eventuality doesn't move too close.

LINDSAY:
Sue and Mike, I want to talk about how we can go about changing that calculation on the part of the Chinese. And I take it that a fundamental theme of the report is that we need to restore reinforced deterrence, which assumes that deterrence can in fact exist. But I'm sort of curious as a sort of preliminary question because this is about what the United States should do, Mike. And that is what do you see as U.S. interests in preserving the current state of affairs with Taiwan or more broadly holding out for a reunification if it comes that is done peacefully?

MULLEN:
The United States has been a long time Pacific power for good reason. We have very strong longstanding alliances in the region: Japan, South Korea, Australia, strong relationships with the ASEAN countries, the countries in that part of the world. And that part of the world also is the center for four of the top five economies in the world. And I think Sue rightly lays out interests, that's to everybody's interest. And part of what has worked really well is the stability over decades in that part of the world. The last time there was any combat operations, I think if I have this right, obviously in Vietnam, but before that in the '50s on the Korean peninsula. So that stability is vital to everybody and the United States' participation in that and assurance that that can be sustained is really critical. So what I think we have to do is to ensure that deterrence is built up in a way, and I do think it has deteriorated over time. I mean the United States has been focused for the last twenty plus years in other parts of the world, and we need to refocus and build capability there to make sure that China can't forcefully generate this outcome of taking Taiwan. 

The report also says that we still strongly believe in the One China policy, that this be resolved peacefully. We shouldn't be squeezing Taiwan towards independence ourselves. That's really a decision for the Taiwanese people to make. That said, again, part of the report focuses on education. The Taiwanese people are much more focused and much more supportive of democracy than they used to be. When this all started, they were essentially run by a dictator, Chiang Kai-shek, an autocratic leader for sure. But in the last thirty years or so, the Taiwanese people have migrated to a view of possibilities from a democratic society standpoint that also makes it that much more challenging. And Sue brought this up, particularly in the wake of what, from my perspective, has been a disaster for China and Hong Kong. Because Hong Kong was promised much the same sort of autonomy, if you will, and essentially Beijing has taken that away. And that was very obvious when I visited there with a bipartisan delegation a year ago March, that was front and center. It wasn't that far downstream from what happened in Hong Kong. 

So the real question for many Taiwanese right now is if we cede that space to the Chinese in some way that seems acceptable, something like a provincial autonomy, will that be sustained over time? And the parametric evidence right now is that probably isn't going to happen, which makes it that much more difficult in terms of where this goes. Particularly because of China's position, which is, "They are basically part of us, have been for," I think someone told me yesterday, "since the fourteenth century." They have felt that this is their land, these are their people. And at the same time, underpinning this is a growing belief, particularly with younger Taiwanese, that they are more Taiwanese than they are Chinese. That's a trend that's also very much in place. So the complexity here is enormous and we have to be very careful and I think very nuanced in how all this gets handled to sustain the kind of stability in terms of a lack of conflict. And both the United States and China have to work this very hard.

LINDSAY:
So let's talk about what steps the United States should take and then maybe we can talk about steps the United States should avoid. Sue, as you look at this issue, what is it that you think the United States should prioritize to be able to shore up deterrence and to prevent a conflict from breaking out over Taiwan?

GORDON:
I think there are many fronts on which we have to affect action, some diplomatic, some economic and some security. On the diplomatic front, where we have to be clear especially in light of some of the recent conversations and activities, that the One China policy that we're maintaining as long as that is predicated on the idea of peaceful and agreed to actions between China and Taiwan. So I think reiterating that, I do think it is important to recognize that while we may know the intention of our actions, our actions are received against someone else's lens. And so I think we need to be very mindful of not being casual or symbolic in our actions because we aren't the ones that pay the price. The price is paid by Taiwan, and that makes them think about what their actions should be. I think strengthening Taiwan's ability for self-defense, whether that is strengthening their position internationally is an important element, strengthening the ability of their own people and forces to be able to act, so do things that will help them in terms of training, not just in weaponry, but just resilience and involvement.

I think we can never underestimate the importance of people to people connections. And I think there are things that the U.S. needs to do to make sure that it is prepared if we are unsuccessful in deterrence in the moment that we have the ability to respond and prepares us. So just think there are some straight diplomatic actions, there are some sound economic actions. And on the economic actions, I think globally making sure that we are on a good footing in terms of supply chain and a wartime footing that has been stretched because of Ukraine, that we really make sure that we have some strength there in those three pillars. I think those are some of the areas. Mike, you might want to jump in and just add to the ones that I've mentioned if I missed any big ones. 

Oh, one more. I think we do need to communicate much more clearly and the study finds this and I think it's almost a central finding of the study. That the U.S. needs to communicate more clearly to the American people why Taiwan is an interest because we will not be successful if we haven't convinced on that front. What I miss, Mike?

MULLEN:
Not much. I mean one of the things that has really strikes me having again visited and then studied this over the last year or so is there are politics everywhere, including on Taiwan. And this year Taiwan has a really critical election. And part of what my view quiet diplomacy from the United States should include is while they're certainly independent and they will figure out how to elect who they want to lead, and that should be left to them. But the rhetoric that is tied to that, particularly with regard to independence, can be very dangerous and needs to be very, very carefully thought through because it can, particularly at a time where our relationship, the United States and China's relationship, is at an all time low. It's the lowest it's been since we established relations with them in 1979. So it's a very dangerous time right now in that regard.

And so I think we have an obligation not just to engage China, but also engage the Taiwanese leadership about sort of guardrails, boundaries, how we see this, what they should expect from us and what they should expect to not have from us as well. Again, the policy is towards independence. I think what Sue said about the American people is absolutely critical. I mean, if we are going to at some point in time, tragically get into a war with China over Taiwan, that needs to be a decision from my perspective, that the American people fully support, that they're educated on. It's their decision. It's almost not the decision of the political leadership that even though technically the political leadership would make it because of the downsides, the incredible downsides of going to war. But we do need to strengthen our military capability in that part of the world.

We do need to try to, wherever China is acting, present a balanced perspective with respect to Taiwan around the world. It is particularly important that we engage our allies out there. I mentioned the Aussies, the South Koreans, the Japanese because it's in their backyard and their participation across the diplomatic, political, military economic spectrum is really critical as well in terms of setting up, it's not just military deterrence but deterrence for the totality of the situation. I do fear that if China, I believed this for a long time, that if China ever believes that Taiwan is going to move down that road to independence, they will act. So we need to make sure that that isn't the message coming from Taiwan as well because of the commitment we have to a peaceful reunification, as well as what that would mean if we had to now make a decision to defend or not.

LINDSAY:
I want to draw you out on just that point, Sue. Obviously one of the big issues in this conversation is whether the United States should come to Taiwan's defense if it were attacked by China. The United States, again, has no treaty obligation to do so. That obligation ended back in 1979 when then President Jimmy Carter tore up the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. The United States has consistently since then not said what it would do though President Biden on at least four occasions said that under his leadership the United States would defend Taiwan. His aides then came out and said the president was not breaking with the standard policy of strategic ambiguity. But where does that leave us? Should the United States be more forward-leaning in saying what it will do if China tries to retake Taiwan by force?

GORDON:
So I think where the study had just great concurrence was on the issue of the U.S. interests in the region, and I don't think it's causal. But I do think what happened in Ukraine puts a very fine point of where we stand in terms of the international order and on whether it is now okay for someone to just resolve geographic boundaries by force. And so I think that issue of interest as well as what happens if we don't support Taiwan and that we lose another liberal democracy, we lose an economic partner and we create more instability in the region, not only for our interests but for our allies' interests. For all those reasons, I think we see how clear it is that it is an interest of ours to weigh in. 

The question you ask on how clear you need to be is really the nub of it. And I think we need to be clear about our interests, are clear about supporting Taiwan and their interests in order to participate in a world economically, be able to participate in democratic activities, but fall short of being clear about how China and Taiwan resolve short of military action. So that it is an interest that we don't support any activities that abrogate the international order. That we don't support activities that are coercive. All those need to be clear and then our posture in the region to maintain our interests. So I think where we come down on the clarity issue, but the clarity issue is not around what China and Taiwan decide to do together. That remains their interest to resolve.

LINDSAY:
Well, Mike, this seems to get back to the point you made earlier about the importance of nuance in any U.S. policy. That what we're seeking to do is to deter but not to provoke. And I guess I'm left wondering how confident you are that we can do that, particularly in light of the fact that this isn't a binary situation where the Chinese either do nothing or they do a 21st century version of D-Day. There's a whole ray of so-called gray zone activities the Chinese could do, which would leave us sort of in a state of not being sure whether this was the change or the action that required us to respond. How do you think about that?

MULLEN:
It's interesting in the gray zone world because we spent a lot of time on this from 2014 to 2022 in Eastern Ukraine and Donbas and Crimea and all the activities that Putin was involved in that were "gray", and then whatever the trigger was in the end, he decided to invade. There are clearly gray zone activities here that we worry about a blockade of some sort, but also the kind of activities that could squeeze Taiwan down in many other ways. I mean, Taiwan, one of the things we should do is help them diversify their economic dependence on mainland China, if you will, because it is significant. And at a time, I mean years ago, I've had hopes that that would somehow normalize and somehow they could get together peacefully because of the economy, that clearly is not headed in that direction right now.

So how can we help them, again across in all those areas, diplomatic, political, military, economic areas, if you will. And also just remind them and remind China quietly that there are counters to these kinds of things. China is incredibly dependent on what comes from the sea as we are. I mean, 90 plus percent of everything that shows up in China comes by sea and so they're very vulnerable from that perspective as well in terms of energy blockade or something like that. Now they're in a little better shape because Russia's now able to provide them with energy resources over the land, but they can also be squeezed. And I think that those are conversations we need to have quietly, not publicly, to remind them that there are counters to them as well. 

And this is, as Sue said, and we say in the report, a vital interest to the United States, so we are going to respond. That's why we talk about deterrence so much. Hopefully the deterrence piece gets ahead of them implementing something like that, which would then if they did that for some kind of response. And I go back to what I said before, all of this is happening as we speak, when the relationship between us and China is in a really bad place. I know that there's a Secretary of State Blinken visit that has just occurred and what comes out of that, really it's too soon to know is a really critical step as an example of trying to raise the relationship up to a higher level. And I'm certain that Taiwan will be front and center in the discussion, if you will, of how do we move forward. 

Lastly, I'd say, I mean back to sort of studying this deeply over the last many months and back to the policy changes, if you will. When this initially was put in place, it was the three communiques, and then Congress who was not included in that in the eighties, decided well they passed their own law, so they passed the Taiwan Relations Act. So that sort of moves front and center and to remind this has been a bipartisan issue forever and still is. There aren't many of those in Washington these days. 

LINDSAY:
That's true.

MULLEN:
But this is one, it's still one. It hasn't come apart in that regard. And then after that, I think it was the late eighties, the "Six Assurances" sort of got placed as the filter at the front through which this whole thing has run. And part of my belief as leaders engage on these issues is we do need to try to see the perspective from, I call it others' eyes. Looking at this from the Chinese perspective, not agreeing with it, but at least trying to understand it, which I think then puts us in a better position to engage and make moves or decisions that at least recognize that China's got a view here as well, and that we don't inadvertently do something really serious to trip the wire in the wrong direction.

LINDSAY:
On that sobering note, I'm going to close up The President's Inbox for this week. My guests have been Susan Gordon, former principal deputy director of National Intelligence and Admiral Michael Mullen, former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. They were the co-chairs of the just released Council on Foreign Relations Task Force report titled U.S. Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China. You can download a copy of the report at cfr.org. Sue, Mike, first off, thank you very much for joining me for this conversation. Second, thank you very much for leading this independent Task Force report. It's very important material. These are very big issues, very consequential issues, and I hope people all around the world, not just in Washington, read it. And finally, let me just say thank you to both of you for your distinguished service in the U.S. government.

MULLEN:
Thanks, Jim.

GORDON:
Thanks, Jim.

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to The President's Inbox in Apple Podcasts, Google Podcast, Spotify, wherever you listen and leave us a review. We love the feedback. The publications mentioned in this episode and a transcript of our conversation are available on the podcast page for The President's Inbox on cfr.org. As always, opinions expressed on The President's Inbox are solely those of the host or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. 

Today's episode was produced by Ester Fang, with Director of Podcasting Gabrielle Sierra. Special thanks go out to Michelle Kurilla for her research assistance. This is Jim Lindsay. Thanks for listening.