‘Davos of the Desert’, Ukraine’s Reconstruction, U.S. Chip Restrictions, and More

MCMAHON:
In the coming week, the Saudi hosted "Davos of the Desert" kicks off, experts convene in Berlin to discuss Ukraine's reconstruction, and restrictions on U.S. semiconductor sales to China start taking effect. It's October 20th, 2022 in time for A World Next Week.
I'm Bob McMahon.

LINDSAY:
And I'm Jim Lindsay. Bob, let's start in Saudi Arabia. Government officials, business leaders, and investors are all set to meet next week in Riyadh, where the sixth edition of the Future Investment Initiative, sometimes dubbed the "Davos of the Desert." The conference fashions itself as addressing the most pressing economic questions of our time in working to shape the future of the global economy. The theme of this year's conference is, "Enabling A New Global Order." What can we expect from the meetings, Bob?

MCMAHON:
Well, first of all, the timing is quite auspicious, Jim, coming not long after the OPEC+ meeting that called for restraining oil production and pretty much delivering a snub to President Biden who thought he had a different understanding with the Saudi leadership and causing a whole cavalcade of responses on the U.S. side. So it's taking place in Saudi Arabia. There was a question about whether U.S. business titans would be going. Many of them are, including JP Morgan Chase's CEO Jamie Dimon.

And as you said, it's a conference that brings together a whole host of business sector leaders. Maybe not so much the broad brush that we've come to see at Davos under the Klaus Schwab leadership, but still, the size of the gathering, something like 6,000 international delegates, 500 international speakers, it's on a Davos type scale. It is also, unlike Davos, which is affiliated with a Swiss individual, this one is affiliated with the crown prince of Saudi Arabia. And so, it's got that aspect of it even though it's not an official Saudi conference, but it's because of that affiliation that previously, shortly after the death of Khashoggi, and a lot of these business leaders did not go. A lot of U.S. business leaders.

LINDSAY:
Well it's because Khashoggi didn't just die, he was murdered at what appears to be the orders of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.

MCMAHON:
Very much connected with him. They made what some saw as a proforma investigation in which some people were carded off, found to be guilty, but not the crown prince. However, that is still very much seen as something done at his direction. So that's still there. As well as broader concern about Saudi human rights efforts, Saudi crackdown on free speech, on protests, on... You name it, any sort of free expression. At the same time, he's trying to open up Saudi Arabia for things like investment, for bold discussions of the future, for let's, say bold discussion of a post carbon future. Even though that's where Saudi Arabia has made its fortune. The country has something on the order of a $600 billion fund that it's created from its oil wealth, and it's doing things like building a city of the future in the desert that's going to cost many hundreds of billions according to estimates.

And so, Saudi Arabia wants to be seen as this country and this partner with the titans of the day in terms of thinking boldly about the future. There's all sorts of ironies here, Jim, but it is a conference worth watching. And also, the fact that there are no official U.S. invitees. Saudis say they don't want this to be soiled with politics. They want it to be about the big bold discussions that the future investment initiative is supposed to be about U.S. officials see a snub. Although it's a question of whether U.S. would've sent any officials to this at this point, given root deal of concern in U.S., especially among democratic lawmakers about the official ties between the U.S. and the Saudis, whether it's defense or other areas.

LINDSAY:
Well, let's talk about that, Bob. Where do you see that heading? As you noted at the beginning of your remarks, the decision by OPEC+ agree to cut oil production, is exactly opposite of what the Biden administration had expected and hoped for. And it has come just two weeks before the U.S. congressional midterm elections, leading many people to infer that this was a deliberate signal sent by the Saudi government and by Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman that he has leverage against the United States and he intends to use it and he's not going to bow to the Biden administration. How do you read all of this?

MCMAHON:
Well, first of all, I'll recite what some of the responses have been. So the Saudis say their decision was purely economic, that they are not siding with Russia, that this was something that was supporting the, "stability and balance of global oil markets." And they've called the U.S. response emblematic of the political silly season that happens in Washington and so forth. On the U.S. side, there was indications that there was some clear agreement that any such step like this was not going to happen certainly before the midterms. And just to point out the extent of importance of this, gas prices are seen as a major litmus test for voters. They are currently actually going down a little bit and no doubt, were helped by an announcement just this week by the Biden administration to release a sizable amount of oil from the strategic reserve.

And so, this is the degree of importance attached to the prices at the pump, which is something that I've seen to bear heavily on American voters. So with all that, it's certainly seen as something in which a country that has been a longstanding U.S. partner, if not ally, in the region, taking this step at this time, was something that was intentional and certainly OPEC+, which has Russia as a member at a time when there's strenuous efforts to isolate Russia and to wall it off from the benefits of its petroleum wealth, this did not help as well. While Russia ratchets up its offensive in different ways in Ukraine including illegally annexing four regions, now it's declared martial law there. All of this adds up to something in which what's supposed to be a U.S. partner that has extensive arms deals and has benefited from the U.S. security relationship suddenly taking this step is seen as something that is going to require more than just rhetoric.

So that there are discussions going on in Washington. I'm not sure how serious they're going to ultimately be, Jim, but there are discussions about maybe we take this relationship down a significant notch. That has all sorts of permutations, including what does that mean in terms of sales at the Saudis, which are extremely lucrative for the defense industry.

LINDSAY:
Those sales certainly are Bob. And as you know, there has been a lot of discussion on Capitol Hill over the last week to 10 days about actually halting those arms sales. And those calls are coming particularly from democratic members of Congress, who believe that in essence, our values with Saudi Arabia, the nature of the relationship has just changed in a fundamental way and we can no longer support and advance it. I will note that the Biden administration has not signed up to those calls and it's hard to see how this would go forward without the administration's consent or approval. But obviously, the administration precisely because it has indicated, at least off the record to journalists, that it feels like it has been double crossed by MBS, is now in a position where people are saying, "Okay, what are you going to do in response?" And that's a real political and policy challenge for the White House because it's not clear what the response could be that wouldn't also hurt other U.S. interests. So it'd be very interesting to see that play out.

I will note that our colleagues, Steven Cook and Martin Indyk, wrote a Council special report that was released this summer about trying to forge a new strategic compact between the United States and Saudi Arabia. You're quite right, we have very deep ties in security front. They go back a very long time. They don't qualify formally as an alliance, as political scientists would define it, but that has been one of the major bilateral relationships in U.S. foreign policy and it is not clear where this is headed in the future. And that may depend to some extent, on what happens here in the United States. Obviously, a lot of speculation if Donald Trump were to win election in 2024 and be inaugurated in January of 2025, that you'd see a very different approach by the Saudis because of the close relations that President Trump and a number of his advisors had with MBS. But again, that's just the future.

MCMAHON:
No, it's a really good point, Jim. And the complicated nature includes the importance of Saudi Arabia or the importance that has been attached to Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis Iran and what is happening with that story. We can devote a whole podcast to that Jim, but suffice it to say it's facing its most serious anti-government demonstrations in decades and were something to become further unstable there or Iran to crack down and become even more hard line and project some of its influence further in the region, the U.S. is going to presumably want to have a strong Saudi counterweight to Iran. And that's something that was raised in the report you mentioned by Martin and Steven.

LINDSAY:
I would also note Bob, that it was during the Trump administration that Iran attacked Saudi oil facilities taking them offline for a day or two and the Trump administration did not respond to the Iranian provocation. Something that I know really shook the Saudi leadership because they had depended for decades on a U.S. security umbrella. Other point to make in all of this is that, green activists are going to point out that what we are seeing today from Saudi Arabia is just another argument why the United States should move as quickly as it possibly can to renewable energy because then we won't be held hostage to decisions made in Riyadh. And I think there's real force to that argument. Of course, there are big challenges in getting from an infrastructure built on fossil fuels to one that is built on renewable technology.

MCMAHON:
That's another great point, Jim. And also the Russian invasion of Ukraine has certainly highlighted the current dependency of the world on fossil fuels still and how that dependency has harmed western countries because of the reliance on Russian natural gas. And so, it's huge issue and it's not something where you can flip a switch and just change that energy dependency. It's going to take a lot more effort that has been exerted so far.

LINDSAY:
And I will note, Bob, you're also going to get a lot of calls from people in the U.S. petroleum industry that the real solution is just, to "drill baby drill" because we have a lot of untapped oil in shale fields and elsewhere that we could get out of the ground if Washington would get out of the way. That obviously, has a lot of environmental consequences.

MCMAHON:
Duly noted, Jim. I want to move up to the European sphere though, and talk about something I just mentioned, which is the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or more specifically an international forum that's taking place in the coming week that's hosted by the German G7 presidency and the European Commission. They're going to bring in experts across disciplines to discuss potential frameworks for Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction and modernization. Now the actions of Russia against Ukraine, particularly some recent lobbying of missiles at infrastructure is not over by any means. So why this meeting now, Jim? What importance should we attach to it?

LINDSAY:
Well, Bob, this is a meeting to try to come up with a plan to help Ukraine get through and recover from the war that Russia started. And the formal title of the meeting is the "International Expert Conference on the Recovery, Reconstruction in Modernization of Ukraine," is going to take place in Berlin. Now, the German government has been organizing it in cooperation with the EU because Germany is currently the president of the G7. And again, as you mentioned, the meeting's to bring together experts to discuss these issues. And I'll just say as background, the German government turned to the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which is supported in part by the German government to come up with some ideas on how to deal with Ukrainian reconstruction and the German Marshall Fund obviously drawing on the memory of the Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe after World War II.

But there are real big questions here and I can go through them pretty quickly. How much money is going to be spent? What is it going to be spent on? Who is going to pay? When is the money going to be spent? And who's going to control the money? And each of those questions is simple to state, but they raise lots of complicated issues like the question of when to spend money. We tend to think the Ukraine war is something that wouldn't last that long and they could go back in and fix things up, but as you noted, this is a war which has not been contained to the Eastern front. The Russians are very clearly targeting civilian infrastructure, they're trying to make it as painful as possible for the Ukrainians, ostensibly to break Ukrainian morale, that is likely to continue. And of course, if the fighting is not just in the Donbas but is going to happen in Kyiv or in towns and villages near Kyiv, that then gets you into the question of how can you start rebuilding now because what you build may be blown up next week or next month.

There's also the big question, we talk about who controls the money? Before the Russians invaded Ukraine, most people in Europe looked at Ukraine as an incredibly corrupt, failed state. So the question is going to become, if we're going to give money to Ukraine, it is going to be essential that we get some promises and we get some promises backed up with enforcement that the Ukraine government spend this money wisely, that it undertake reforms, political and economic, so we don't end up providing money and then having the money be siphoned off by other people. These are really big questions.

Again, their questions are going to be answered by numerous countries who are going to argue about what they should be required to do or pay and whether the burden is being felt equally or not. As you know, there has been a lot of talk about the gap between the promises that many European countries have made to Ukraine since February and what they have actually delivered. And this gets caught up in all kinds of intra-European politics against the backdrop of the history that influences how everybody sees the motives and the morals of the other players. And so, this is going to go on. This is not a conference that is going to end with a fully formed Marshall Plan for Ukraine. I think this is really the beginning or continuation of the debate about what to do? How to do it? And how to make it work?

MCMAHON:
Because of all of that, Jim, I think it's going to be a huge achievement just to come forward with a coherent agenda and some sort of timetable even to help Ukraine because of all those issues. Even just looking at the composition of the G7, you have U.S. heading into a midterm where the party in waiting for congressional power, seemingly the Republicans, have been making comments like, "there's no blank cheque for Ukrainian aid," and so forth. That's from Kevin McCarthy who could be the coming house speaker. You have Italy with a new conservative government called the most far right since the Mussolini days and some of them with stronger ties to Putin than most others in Europe. And you have France facing serious domestic disturbances now, over the way Emanuel Macron is running in the country.

It's not clear how much interest there will be among the French to be helping out Ukraine with billions of dollars or hundreds of millions, whatever the outpouring is, given that country's own concern at a time when there's so many domestic challenges going on. I will say, one thing that would also be useful to point out though, because something that concerns the entire world is whether this conference can help safeguard the way in which Ukrainian agriculture is able to survive and continue to send food, send fertilizer as the case may be, although a lot of that comes from Russia, but really, to send food to markets that desperately need, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

LINDSAY:
Certainly Bob. There's a lot there and I think it's important to stress that Putin's strategy for winning the war in Ukraine, now clearly has focused on breaking the will of the West and he is hoping that through driving up gasoline prices, energy prices, that the cost of Europeans who are supporting Ukraine is going to get too high. In essence, the political systems are going to break and then they're going to cry uncle and want to go back to the way things existed before February 24. Again, I don't believe that that strategy is going to work, but it is clear that Western will and unity is going to be tested and the test is going to be bigger, the harsher winter is across Europe.

What I will note, you mentioned the Italian elections, Giorgia Meloni, who's likely to be the new prime minister of Italy, comes from this right wing party that has its roots in a fascist past. She's actually backed Ukraine and Zelensky. And again, if you look at the election result, the two other parties led by Mr. Saldini and former Prime Minister Berlusconi, they actually lost votes and these were the parties that had been closest to or more forward leaning in their sympathies for Vladimir Putin. I don't think it's lost on soon-to-be Prime Minister Meloni about how that electoral math worked out.

And here in the United States, you're quite right, that Kevin McCarthy gave a speech that if Republicans take back Congress, certainly, if they take back the House which appears to be likely, given history and where the polls stand, that they won't write blank cheques. I will note here a couple of things, however, one is that it didn't say they would not support Ukraine. He said they would not be blank cheques. Second thing is that, that comment by McCarthy has triggered some substantial pushback from other Republicans, most notably Mike Pence, who's been very vocal about how Republicans have to support Ukraine because bigger U.S. interests are at stake.
And again, there is a vocal numerical minority among Republicans that wants to wash its hands of Ukraine. That is not where most Republicans are and certainly not most Republican senators. And one would imagine that if Republicans take back the Senate, Senator Mitch McConnell will use all the legislative crafts that he knows to be able to make sure we don't end up in a situation in which U.S. support for Ukraine gets cut off. The big wild card in all this of course, is that we could end up with a situation in which Republicans control the House by the narrowest of margins and then it may become difficult for the Republican party to pass any agenda and that could just complicate Ukraine, not directly, but simply as a broader pattern in which Speaker McCarthy is unable to get all of his members to agree on what to do.

One thing I would expect though if Republicans come back, is to hear more about this, "Why are we spending money to secure Ukraine's borders but not to protect our own borders?" What I would expect to see is a legislative vehicle that says, no money for Ukraine until we do something about America's southern border and that will force Democrats and particularly the Biden administration, to potentially make some decisions they don't want to have to make. So I think we'll do our congressional midterm consequences podcast in a few weeks.

MCMAHON:
There's so much there, Jim. You're absolutely right. Yeah. And a couple things worth noting that under the Trump administration, Republicans made common cause with Democrats actually, in arming Ukrainians prior to the Russian invasion. Javelin missiles among other things were provided and beefed up during that period, running counter to what parts of the Trump administration were signaling on that front. And then also now into the Biden administration, I would note that there have been reports that the border wall, which has been seen as anathema by many Democrats, actually the construction has continued and maintenance has continued on that front. There are all sorts of interesting cross currents going on the way U.S. policy gets made sometimes, Jim.

LINDSAY:
That is certainly true, Bob, and I will note that while construction of the wall may be continuing, that is not something the Biden administration is trying to highlight, again the peculiarities of domestic politics. But let's switch gears Bob and talk about China. And I will note that in August the Biden administration signed the CHIPS in Science Act. Among other things, the legislation authorizes $52 billion in subsidies for U.S. domestic semiconductor manufacturing. Now last week, the Biden administration followed up on the CHIPS and Science Act by announcing new restrictions set to go into effect in coming weeks that prevent U.S. firms and citizens from supporting semiconductor development in production in China. Is this significant?

MCMAHON:
Jim, it's hugely significant and I think with each passing day you're starting to see reports, reactions and so forth coming out that are indicating just how significant. I would note, our colleague Ted Alden has a piece up on our side republished from foreign policy where he lays out that this is bigger than anything that's happened previously in terms of such measures against China and it have huge echoes from the Cold War era where some may recall the term dual use goods. I distinctly remember the trade with the Soviet Union was very much hampered by the fact that so many goods were seen as having military or national security implications and so they were cut off. We're now back in that territory to some extent. The new measures, for example, Jim, are going to block sales of semiconductors that are using developing artificial intelligence, super computers and other critical technologies and also expand the prohibitions on sale to China of equipment that can be used in making its own chips.

China does not make a huge amount right now. It makes about 15% of the global supply of such chips. And these are chips we should note, as Ted does in his piece, that are of a very advanced quality that is only possessed by a certain number of firms in a way that the U.S. can control to great deal. Now, we could see as China continues to huddle with its manufacturers according to recent reports, we could see some sort of newly announced program, a "great leap forward" in chip manufacturing, China's own chips act. Maybe that will be a response to this because the implications are becoming very clear.

We've also seen China appealing to the U.S. not to go ahead with such onerous steps. Not sure whether that's going to have any impact at all, Jim. So it's a very big deal. I think the impact on both China and U.S. firms that do business with China, which saw their stocks go way down after the announcement, we're going to still come to grips with what exactly this means and what it means for the global economy. We're even hearing that from places like Singapore and other countries that it's got to have a really chilling effect on global economic stability.

LINDSAY:
Well certainly Bob because third countries have to worry about getting caught in the crosshairs, whether intentionally or unintentionally. And again, this gets us back to the fact that the United States, while it may constitute a declining relative share of world economic output, has disproportionate financial strength and leverage, and the United States has a way to, in essence, act extraterritorially through its laws to impose its preferences and others, something that grates on many countries. And again, there's often talk about trying to escape from the dollar and the tyranny of American sanctions legislation, but it is exceedingly hard to do.

MCMAHON:
Yeah, we're going to continue to hear the word decoupling quite a bit. I mean I think first of all, people are going to get a broader sense. People meaning Americans and others. A broader sense of just how intertwined still U.S. and Chinese economies are. And that's among the many big differences between Soviet days and the Cold War days, was called, what's referred to in the economic parlances as an autarky in the Soviet Union, very much cut off from international bodies and trade and global supply chains and so forth. China's a very different story. However, this is happening and there continue to be challenged against China for things like its crack down in Xinjiang against the Uyghurs and other human rights issues and things that the Chinese regime under Xi and we're seeing that they're doubling down of their policies in their current Congress underway. That they are resentful of this and are doubling down on their policies and they are not going to yield or soften their approach for what they see as an important way of running the country and going about their business and protecting Chinese interests.

So, we're looking at a new frontline here, Jim, and we don't really know how much more it's going to expand.

LINDSAY:
You're certainly right Bob, and I think it is important to stress that Xi Jinping is not the CEO of China. He is the general secretary of the Communist Party. He is not looking to maximize profits. He's looking to ensure control. And one of the potential ironies is that he could end up undermining and destroying the very dynamism that has made possible this amazing ascension of Chinese economic strength and vitality. One of the really remarkable things we talk about, semiconductors, as good as the Chinese have been, they still lag behind Western countries. It's not just U.S. technology, but the technology of many American friends and allies, the Japanese, South Koreans and the like. They have not been able to close the gap and this is a big issue.

Likewise, let's think of vaccines. The Chinese have not been able to produce or replicate the kind of mRNA technology that has made possible the vaccines we have for dealing with COVID, that may not be perfect, but have clearly moved us out of the acute pandemic phase into something quite different. And there's been a lot of talk recently that this kind of technology has applications variety of other medical problems, I think in particular cancer that could be revolutionary. So the Chinese may be in a situation in which Xi Jinping in asserting control, is going to lose economic vitality. The other thing I really do want to point out, Bob, on the Chips and Science Act is that this is legislation that authorizes these subsidies for U.S. semiconductor manufacturing. And there are two things to note. $52 billion sounds like it's a lot, but building semiconductor facilities or FABs is exorbitantly expensive.

And also note, they don't create a lot of jobs. A lot of this is done by robots and the like. And of course, to the extent it does employ people, it employs people who have very extensive education and training. This is not something that you throw together in the back of somebody's garage. But the other thing is that the money actually has not been appropriated, that remains to be done. And this takes us back to our prior conversation that we could, after the midterm elections and the swearing in of a new Congress in January, have a Congress that can't get things done.

The raucous, deep, political polarization and partisanship that exists between the parties could be further complicated by some real sharp divisions within parties. And again, I'll point to the frustrations the Biden administration had with a 50/50 Senate and the disproportion influences senators like Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema had frustrating democratic ambitions. You could potentially see something like that happen, particularly on the House side of Republicans, come back in where Republicans are the majority, but getting agreement to pass legislation. Democrats aren't likely to help because Republicans didn't help them, could lead us stumbling from crisis to crisis.

MCMAHON:
The only thing that could cut through that Jim, I would think, would be the overwhelming sense now we're seeing among Democrats, but already with some Republicans, especially pro-Trump Republicans let's say, is this sense of solidarity against China. So even amidst the bitter turf battles and divisiveness, that's not going to go away, that they do make common cause in an effort to challenge China and also help certain red states with chip manufacturing and so forth. Potentially that overrides it, Jim.

LINDSAY:
I will note that Ohio is looking forward to getting a very large chip manufacturing plan.

MCMAHON:
Absolutely. Jim, we've talked our way into the audience figure of the week part of the podcast in which listeners now can vote every Tuesday and Wednesday on CFR_org Instagram story. Jim, the audience on Instagram selected this week, "U.S. Backs International Troops to Haiti." Can you tell us a bit about why that's significant?

LINDSAY:
Well, Bob, I think our listeners were reacting to a story that broke in the Washington Post earlier this week that said that the United States had drafted a UN Security Council resolution encouraging the immediate deployment of a multinational rapid action force to Haiti, where the security and humanitarian situation has deteriorated significantly over the last month to six weeks. Now, the immediate spark to the crisis in Haiti, as we've discussed before, was Prime Minister Ariel Henry's announcement last month that Haiti could no longer afford to subsidize fuel prices. In response, one of Haiti's most powerful gangs surrounded the country's major fuel terminal. Apparently, 70 percent of Haiti's fuel goes through this terminal. They blocked any trucks from leaving the terminal and they have demanded Prime Minister Henry's resignation. Now, this move has disrupted life in the country at a time when Haiti also happens to be dealing with a major cholera outbreak, high unemployment, rampant inflation, and widespread gang activity in other parts of the country.

The broader challenge has been Haiti's downward spiral since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse back in July 2021. That assassination still has not been solved. The investigation into it appears to have stalled and there have been multiple allegations that Henry himself played a role in Moïse's assassination and many Haitians point to the fact that he had been named Prime Minister by Moïse, but not yet sworn in to dismiss him as an illegitimate leader. Now, the news of the U.S. resolution came in response to calls from UN Secretary General António Guterres for the creation of the international force to bolster the Haitian national police. But the Biden administration has long been reluctant to involve the U.S. military in Haiti.

Just two things to note about the resolution. First is the United Nation Security Council has yet to discuss, let alone vote on it. And second, the resolution doesn't specify which countries would participate in the multinational force. The administration is indicated in these off the record, background undisclosed senior official that the U.S. military, should this force come about, would only provide logistical support to the force and there would be no U.S. military boots on the ground. I should add that over the weekend, the U.S. Air Force and Canadian Air Force both cooperated in transporting armored vehicles and other supplies to Haiti. These are supplies that apparently, the Haitian government had paid for and they're meant to be used by the Haitian national police, which as best I can tell, is really outnumbered and outgunned by the many gangs that are operating. And we're left with some big questions, Bob. Are we going to get a multilateral rapid reaction force? What will its mandate be? And what kind of reception will it receive should it arrive in Haiti?

MCMAHON:
Yeah, and as you indicated, Jim, there's not a great track record of international intervention in Haiti in terms of in a security capacity. Have they saved lives? Yes, absolutely. Including after the devastating earthquake about 10 or 11 years ago and in many other ways. But there have also been problems of international peacekeepers, for example, introducing cholera to the country or becoming enmeshed in sexual assault cases and so forth, as well as other incidents that tend to happen when you have an international force abruptly introduced into another context. I do think there might be some sense of having some kind of a regional, if there is to be some sort of a rapid reaction force that it'd be regional. If it's U.S. helping on logistics, maybe it's some other leading countries in the region helping with the actual man and woman power that can help bring this to an end or at least stabilize the country a little bit in part because of self-interest.

There are Haitians by the hundreds of thousands who are fleeing the country, who are landing as far away as Chile, who are crossing the extremely dangerous Darien Gap. And we have a recent interactive on our website that I would refer people to, as well as making sea crossings that are really dangerous. And so, there's a number of reasons why it would make a lot of sense to have some sort of a regional response with the UN's blessing and UN's resources and so forth. But it's a long path to that, Jim. And it's unfortunately with Haiti and what it's experienced already, it could get far worse before it gets better.

LINDSAY:
It certainly could, Bob.

MCMAHON:
Well, that's our look at the turbulent World Next Week. Here are some other stories to keep an eye on. One of India's biggest holidays, Diwali, or Festival Light, is marked. Roman Catholic Pope Francis holds a mass for World Mission Day and the UN begins its Disarmament Week.

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to The World Next Week on Apple Podcast, Google Podcast, Spotify, wherever you get your podcasts and leave us a review while you're at it, we appreciate the feedback. The articles mentioned in this episode, as well as a transcript of our conversation are listed on the podcast page for The World Next Week on cfr.org. Please note that opinions expressed in The World Next Week or solely those of the hosts or our guests not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's program was produced by Ester Fang, with senior podcast producer Gabrielle Sierra. Special thanks, brought to Michelle Kurilla and Sinet Adous for their research assistance. Our theme music is provided by Miguel Herrero and licensed under Creative Commons. This is Jim Lindsay saying, so long.

MCMAHON:
And this is Bob McMahon saying, goodbye and be careful out there.